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The authors review the literature on the 2 main models of the placebo effect: expectancy theory and
classical conditioning. A path is suggested to dissolving the theoretical impasse that has long plagued this
issue. The key is to make a clear distinction between 2 questions: What factors shape placebo effects?
and What learning mediates the placebo effect? The reviewed literature suggests that classical condi-
tioning procedures are one shaping factor but that verbal information can also shape placebo effects. The
literature also suggests that conditioning procedures and other sources of information sometimes shape
conscious expectancies and that these expectancies mediate some placebo effects; however, in other cases
conditioning procedures appear to shape placebo effects that are not mediated by conscious cognition.
The placebo effect is a topic of interest to psychologists and
health practitioners in a wide variety of areas, and the question of
the mechanisms underlying this effect is gaining increasing atten-
tion. In this article, we review the literature related to the two main
approaches to the placebo phenomenon: expectancy theory and
classical conditioning. According to expectancy theory, placebo
effects are mediated by explicit (consciously accessible) expect-
ancies. In contrast, according to the classical conditioning ap-
proach, they are conditioned responses (CRs).
We begin with the problematic issue of defining placebos and
placebo effects, and we then turn to the question of whether these
effects actually exist. Having established that they do, we shift the
focus to the main task of the article: determining the roles of
expectancy and conditioning in the placebo effect. This task is
divided into two parts. The first has the aim of clearing up the
confusion that exists in the placebo literature concerning the rela-
tionship between conditioning and expectancy. These approaches
are often pitted against one another, under the assumption that
either expectancy theory or classical conditioning accounts for the
placebo effect. We reject this view, arguing that the two ap-
proaches are compatible. One stumbling block is the assumption
that classical conditioning is a particular form of learning, neces-
sarily distinct from expectancy learning. However, conditioning is
defined in terms of stimulus inputs and their subsequent effects.
Specifically, an organism has been classically conditioned when
exposure to a contingency between a conditioned stimulus (CS)
and an unconditioned stimulus (US) results in a relevant change in
the organism’s state or behavior. This leaves open the question of
what mechanisms mediate conditioning. In some cases, condition-
ing procedures lead to nonconscious learning, and the effects of
conditioning are not cognitively mediated. In other cases, though,
conditioning effects are mediated by conscious expectancies.
Thus, expectancy theory provides an explanation for some exam-
ples of classical conditioning. Furthermore, expectancies are not
shaped only by conditioning procedures, but also by factors such
as verbal information and observational learning (Kirsch, 1997;
Rachman, 1977).
The next section applies the results of this analysis to the
placebo effect. In the wake of the analysis, the question is no
longer whether expectancy theory or classical conditioning ac-
counts for the placebo effect. Instead, one is left with several
distinct questions concerning (a) the sources of learning in the
placebo effect, and (b) the mediation of such effects. First, are any
placebo effects examples of classical conditioning? In other words,
do conditioning procedures shape placebo effects? If so, are these
effects mediated by explicit expectancies, or do they involve
learning that is not cognitively mediated? Second, are there pla-
cebo effects that are not a product of conditioning procedures? If
so, are these effects mediated by expectancies? Our review sug-
gests that some placebo effects are indeed examples of classical
conditioning. Of these, some are mediated by explicit expectancies
and some are not. On the other hand, some placebo effects are not
examples of classical conditioning, as they are shaped by verbal
information rather than conditioning procedures. These effects are
presumably always mediated by explicit cognition. Our overall
conclusion is that expectancy theory provides a partial account of
the mediation of placebo effects, and conditioning procedures are
one among several factors shaping such effects.
Definitions
Issues of definition have been fundamentally problematic in the
placebo field (Gru¨nbaum, 1981). To try to bring some order to the
proliferation of definitions for the terms placebo and placebo
effect, we begin with a description of the archetypal placebo event.
We then show that different definitions emphasize different as-
pects of this schema and vary in how broadly they interpret those
aspects on which they focus. Finally, we present the definitions
that guide this review.
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The archetypal placebo event occurs in a medical setting. A
physician gives a patient a pill that, unbeknownst to the patient, is
merely a sugar pill. This is the placebo. Presently, the patient’s
health improves, apparently because of the belief that the pill was
a pharmacological agent, effective for the condition. This is the
placebo effect.
Although the description is simple, distilling definitions from it
is not. Many reasonable definitions can be concocted that fit these
facts. Consider the term placebo. The narrowest definition would
limit use of the term to sugar pills given by physicians to sick
patients. No one accepts such a narrow definition, but problems
occur as soon one tries to broaden it. To begin with, we might
broaden the term to include any “substances, given in the guise of
active medication, but which in fact have no pharmacological
effect on the condition being treated” (Kirsch, 1985a, p. 238). This
definition highlights the inertness of the intervention and is broad
enough to accommodate inert pills, capsules, liquid medicines,
topical creams, and injections. It can also accommodate the exotic
array of medicines that have been prescribed by healers in the past
but which are now viewed as placebos, such as lizard’s blood,
tiger’s penis, crocodile dung, fox lung, spider web, snake oil, and
powdered Egyptian mummy (M. Ross & Olson, 1981; Shapiro &
Shapiro, 1997). Substances used to treat one condition are some-
times used as placebos for others. These are known as active
placebos. Implicit in the concept of an active placebo is the idea
that a placebo need not be inert in any absolute sense but only in
relation to a particular effect that is expected or sought by the
placebo recipient or provider.
This is a good start, but it is necessary to go further and expand
the definition to include procedures as well as substances (Shapiro
& Morris, 1978; Wickramasekera, 1985). This broader definition
is presupposed in the fact that control procedures used in clinical
medical trials are typically labeled placebos. These include pla-
cebo surgery (which involves opening the patient up but not
performing any operation), placebo acupuncture (e.g., needling
nonacupuncture points), and the use of machines that have not
been turned on (such as transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation
devices; Hro´bjartsson & Gøtzsche, 2001; Moerman & Jonas,
2000).
The next question is whether the definition should encompass
psychotherapeutic procedures. We argue that this is acceptable, but
there are justified concerns to which we must attend (Kirsch, 1978;
Lambert & Bergin, 1994; Wilkins, 1984). These trace to the
suggestion that placebos are inert. The trouble is that placebos
sometimes appear to have genuine effects. In the case of placebo
substances and physical procedures, this seems to pose no prob-
lem; one can just assume that they are physically inert but not
psychologically inert (Kirsch, 1985a). However, if placebos are
defined as agents that act through psychological rather than phys-
ical mechanisms, extending the placebo concept to psychothera-
pies becomes problematic. Indeed, the result would be that all
psychotherapies are placebos by definition. This is clearly an
undesirable conclusion. However, the problem is not with the idea
that a psychotherapeutic technique could be a placebo (presumably
not every imaginable psychotherapy is effective); the problem is
with defining placebos as agents that act through psychological
mechanisms. Why does it seem inappropriate to call all psycho-
therapies placebos? Presumably, it is because this might suggest
they are inert, and we know they are not. But this suggests that, in
our ordinary understanding of the term, inertness is more important
than mechanisms.
Unfortunately, this leaves the original concern: Defining place-
bos as inert seems to imply that they cannot produce effects. Our
solution is that placebos should be considered inert only in the
sense that they have no inherent powers to produce a given effect.
Inherent powers are those that are “in” a substance or procedure.
Later we discuss how the same placebo can lead to different effects
depending on what the recipient is told about it or the recipient’s
conditioning history with it. In such cases, the cause of the differ-
ence could not be in the placebo, for the same placebo is used. The
cause must be in the recipient. Defining placebos this way captures
the intuition that placebos are inert but without ruling out the
possibility that they can result in placebo effects. Placebo effects
are effects that, though attributable to the administration of a
substance or procedure, are not due to the inherent powers of a
substance or procedure. If they occur at all, they must be due to
some relevant belief or learning in regard to the placebo. Further-
more, with the criterion of inherent powers, it is no longer prob-
lematic to extend the placebo concept to psychological procedures.
A psychotherapy placebo is simply a psychological procedure that
has no inherent power to produce an effect. So, for instance, if a
procedure works only because a person believes it will, it is a
psychotherapy placebo. Otherwise it is an active treatment. Note
that the response to an active treatment may be partly due to its
inherent powers and partly to a placebo effect.
In the foregoing discussion, we began with a focus on the
archetypal placebo, the sugar pill, and then found a suitably broad
phrase (substances or procedures) to cover this aspect of the
scenario. There was also an unstated assumption that the medical
setting was a defining characteristic. Both of these initial emphases
can be challenged. First, instead of starting with the sugar pill,
some theorists focus on the physician’s actions more generally, or
on the entire therapeutic context. For instance, according to the
common factors approach, placebos should be defined as elements
that are common across all or most therapies (e.g., the empathy of
the healer, the provision of a diagnosis), as opposed to those
aspects that vary across different maladies (Critelli & Neumann,
1984). Placebo effects are then defined as the effects of these
nonspecific factors. The common factors approach raises the same
problems associated with defining placebos in terms of psycho-
logical mechanisms: Aspects of therapy best viewed as active
components, such as empathy, would be labeled placebos; further-
more, inert pills would not be classed as placebos because they are
not common to all therapies (Kirsch, 1985a). In short, the original
sense of the word is lost.
An alternative approach is to maintain the focus on substances
and procedures but not specify that these must mimic therapeutic
substances or procedures. Then, rather than defining placebo ef-
fects as changes in health-related variables, they would include any
change related to the administration of a placebo. We favor this
approach, as it brings the definitions more closely into line with
common usage. There are, for example, experiments investigating
the effects of nonmedical placebos such as placebo coffee (decaf-
feinated coffee presented as regular coffee) and placebo alcohol,
and the effects of these substances on healthy volunteers are
regarded as placebo effects (Kirsch & Weixel, 1988; Newlin,
1989). Furthermore, there is a body of research on the placebo
effect in healthy nonhuman animals (Ader, 1985; Herrnstein,
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1962; S. Ross & Schnitzer, 1963). Implicit in this usage is the idea
that placebos and placebo effects need not occur in medical
settings.
Finally, it is sometimes argued that placebo effects are, by
definition, desirable effects. After all, the word placebo comes
from the Latin meaning “to please,” and the archetypal placebo
event involves an improvement in health. The undesirable effects
of inert agents have been dubbed nocebo effects, and the agents
producing them nocebos (Hahn, 1997). Just as inert agents can
produce analgesia, they can also produce hyperalgesia (Benedetti
& Amanzio, 1997). In the latter case, the inert agent would be a
nocebo and the hyperalgesia a nocebo effect. However, there are
several problems with the placebo–nocebo distinction. Inert agents
may sometimes simultaneously produce both desirable and unde-
sirable symptoms. For example, the response may mimic not only
the healing effects of drugs and other treatments, but also some of
their side effects (Shapiro, Chassan, Morris, & Frick, 1974). In
such instances, we would have to say that the agent in question is
both a placebo and a nocebo. It would be more parsimonious to say
that the same agent (a placebo) can simultaneously produce both
desirable and undesirable effects. Another problem is that the same
effect might be desirable for one person but undesirable for an-
other. For instance, placebo immunosuppression may be undesir-
able to most people but desirable to people suffering an autoim-
mune disorder (Olness & Ader, 1992). In this case, we would have
to say that the former group had taken nocebos but the latter
placebos, and we could not know which we had administered until
we had established whether the recipients considered the effects
desirable or not. Furthermore, although the same effect was pro-
duced in both cases, and presumably through the same mecha-
nisms, by labeling one a placebo effect and one a nocebo effect, we
would in effect be treating it as two different phenomena, simply
because it was desirable to one group but not the other. These
considerations lead us to suggest that, despite the origin of the
word placebo, the desirability of the effect should not be part of the
definition, and the terms placebo and placebo effect should cover
the whole field.
Bearing in mind the various points we have raised, we define
our terms as follows.
A placebo is a substance or procedure that has no inherent
power to produce an effect that is sought or expected.
A placebo effect is a genuine psychological or physiological
effect, in a human or another animal, which is attributable to
receiving a substance or undergoing a procedure, but is not
due to the inherent powers of that substance or procedure.
The Placebo Effect: Fact or Fiction?
It is one thing to define a phenomenon, but it is quite another to
show that there exists something in the world to which that
definition corresponds. In the past few years, several commenta-
tors have argued that the placebo effect is small or nonexistent
(Hro´bjartsson & Gøtzsche, 2001; Kienle & Kiene, 1997). In this
section, we assess the evidence for and against this position. We
argue that, despite claims to the contrary, the placebo effect is a
genuine and potentially important phenomenon.
Much of the evidence presented in support of the placebo effect
has come from placebo-controlled drug trials. These trials rarely
include a no-treatment, or natural history, control group against
which to compare any changes in the placebo group (Hro´bjartsson
& Gøtzsche, 2001). As a result, there is no way to know that the
participants would not have improved without the placebo. Appar-
ent placebo effects may have been due to confounding factors,
such as spontaneous remission, regression to the mean, patients
seeking alternative treatment when the placebo fails to work, or
health-related behavioral changes associated with following a
medical regimen, such as refraining from drinking alcohol (Kienle &
Kiene, 1997; Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1999; M. Ross & Olson, 1981).
A recent meta-analysis of placebo-controlled clinical trials
aimed to assess the magnitude of the placebo effect while avoiding
this potential pitfall (Hro´bjartsson & Gøtzsche, 2001). Among the
inclusion criteria was that the chosen studies must include a
placebo group and a no-treatment control group. A total of 114
studies were located, including both medical and psychotherapy
trials. By comparing the magnitude of change in the placebo
groups with that of the no-treatment groups, Hro´bjartsson and
Gøtzsche (2001) were able to estimate the magnitude of the
placebo effect. Their conclusion was that these effects are less
widespread and weaker than formerly believed. They found sig-
nificant placebo effects only with studies that used continuous
measures as opposed to dichotomous data (e.g., cured vs. not
cured) and only when subjective rather than objective measures
were used. A separate analysis of the placebo effect for pain
treatment yielded a significant result, but the effect size was
relatively small.
At first glance, this result appears to challenge existing wisdom
on the placebo effect, suggesting that the phenomenon is confined
to small changes in pain report and maybe some other subjective
experiences. However, there are good reasons to think that the
effect is both real and more powerful than Hro´bjartsson and
Gøtzsche (2001) concluded. Their meta-analysis had several no-
table deficiencies. First and most important, it lumped together
studies ranging across 40 different maladies (Ader, 2001; Brody &
Weismantel, 2001; Greene et al., 2001; Kirsch & Scoboria, 2001).
These included conditions as diverse as hypertension, asthma,
Raynaud’s disease, alcohol abuse, anxiety, and marital discord. As
Ader (2001) noted, “evaluating the effects of (different) placebo
interventions by combining studies on different disease processes
may be analogous to evaluating the efficacy of an active drug by
combining the results from studies of its effects on different
disease processes” (p. 295). Placebo effects in some conditions
may have been obscured by their inclusion with conditions that are
not susceptible to such effects (Kirsch & Scoboria, 2001). It would
only make sense to combine these diverse studies if it were main-
tained that placebos are effective across all disorders. However, this is
not a position that any placebo researchers hold (Ader, 2001).
A more meaningful analysis would have involved assessing the
magnitude of the placebo effect separately for each different
condition.1 Of the 40 maladies represented in Hro´bjartsson and
Gøtzsche’s (2001) study, however, only 1 (pain) had a large
enough pooled sample that a separate analysis was possible. Im-
portantly, in this condition the researchers did find a placebo
effect. It is not the case that they found no placebo effects for any
1 Alternatively, they could have done a moderator analysis to compare
placebo effects across conditions (see Overton, 1998).
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other malady; instead, the issue simply could not be decided (Ader,
2001). In many cases, though, there was a nonsignificant trend in
the direction of a placebo effect, and had the pooled sample been
large enough in such cases, significant effects may have been
found. As for the finding that no placebo effects were found in
studies that used dichotomous data, it should be noted that these
data could smother some clinically meaningful effects. For in-
stance, a 50% reduction in smoking would be classed as not cured,
but may nonetheless be a placebo effect with important health
implications (Greene et al., 2001).
Thus, the Hro´bjartsson & Gøtzsche (2001) meta-analysis does
not allow one to evaluate whether there are clinically meaningful
placebo effects in any condition other than pain. However, other
evidence strongly suggests that placebos can have important ef-
fects on a number of parameters, both subjective and objective.
The first point to emphasize is that the criticism that conclusions
about the placebo effect are based on placebo-controlled studies
without no-treatment control groups applies almost exclusively to
the clinical literature. There is also a body of experimental litera-
ture that is perfectly well controlled. The studies we now review,
and those cited throughout this article, all include no-treatment
control groups or some other method that allows for the proper
assessment of placebo effects.
Table 1 lists effect sizes for a representative sample of well-
controlled studies, including both subjective and objective effects.
All except 2 of the 16 effect sizes are equal to or greater than 0.50
standard deviations, a medium effect size (Cohen, 1977). Looking
first at subjective effects, the condition in which researchers have
most thoroughly investigated the placebo effect is pain (Benedetti
& Amanzio, 1997; Kleijnen, de Craen, van Everdingen, & Krol,
1994). A variety of placebos have produced analgesia in people
experiencing pain of various sorts. These include chronic head-
aches (de Craen, Tijssen, de Gans, & Kleijnen, 2000; Spanos et al.,
1993) and pain produced by a number of different means in
experimental settings (Benedetti, Amanzio, Baldi, Casadio, &
Maggi, 1999; de Jong, van Baast, Arntz, & Merkelbach, 1996;
Montgomery & Kirsch, 1996, 1997; Price et al., 1999; Voudouris,
Peck, & Coleman, 1985, 1989, 1990). Another condition for which
there is good evidence of a placebo effect is depression. Kirsch and
Sapirstein (1999) conducted a meta-analysis comparing placebo
pills with no-treatment for depression and reached the conclusion
that at least 50% of the short-term response to antidepressants was
a placebo effect. Other placebo-induced changes in subjective
experience include changes in self-reports of arousal (Kirsch &
Weixel, 1988) and sedation (Jensen & Karoly, 1991).
Although the best-corroborated placebo effects pertain to the
influence of placebos on subjective states, objective effects have
also been demonstrated. This includes one of the major findings in
the placebo field, namely, that placebo analgesia is often associ-
ated with the release of endorphins in the brain. This is shown by
the fact that the administration of naloxone, a substance that blocks
endorphin receptors, sometimes also blocks placebo analgesia
(Benedetti & Amanzio, 1997; Levine, Gordon, & Fields, 1978). A
related discovery is that conditioning with nonopioid analgesics
can shape a placebo analgesic effect that involves nonopioid pain
mechanisms in the nervous system (Amanzio & Benedetti, 1999).
Table 1
Effect Sizes (ds) for a Sample of Placebo Studies Using Appropriate Controls
Study Placebo manipulation d
Amanzio & Benedetti (1999) Injected saline solution increased tolerance to ischemic arm
pain. d is based on Figure 3B, p. 488.
0.52
De Pascalis et al. (2002) Bogus analgesic cream decreased induced finger pain.
Average d is based on “high expectation,” “100% drug”








Fillmore & Vogel-Sprott (1992) Coffee placebo enhanced (a) or impaired (b) sensorimotor




Ho et al. (1988) Reduced facial swelling following dental surgery for placebo
ultrasound (a) and stationary placebo ultrasound (b).
0.77a (a)
0.78a (b)
Jensen & Karoly (1991) Increased sedation following a high dose vs. a low dose
bogus oral drug. Average d based on “Order 1” means
and standard deviations in Table 1, p. 147.
0.84
Kirsch & Sapirstein (1999) Meta-analysis (19 studies) of antidepressant medications’
placebo effect (p. 313).
0.79
Luparello et al. (1968) Airway reactivity in presence of bogus allergen. d for
asthmatic group from Table 1, p. 820.
1.26
Price et al. (1999) Ratings of heat-induced pain reduced by bogus topical
analgesic for both intensity (a) and unpleasantness (b). d
is based on control vs. “strong” placebo only.
0.57 (a)
0.60 (b)
Spanos et al. (1993) Perceived pain reduction from migraine/tension headaches




Note. d estimates were calculated as the mean of the experimental group minus the mean of the control
group, divided by the pooled standard deviation (Cohen, 1977). All associated significance tests yielded p .05.
a d estimated from t: d  t na  nb/nanb (Cohen, 1977).
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There are various other objectively measurable placebo effects.
Self-reports of increased arousal and sedation are sometimes as-
sociated with increases and decreases in blood pressure and heart
rate (Frankenhaeuser, Jarpe, Svan, & Wrangsjo, 1963; Kirsch &
Weixel, 1988). In patients prone to asthma, a placebo inhaler can
induce bronchoconstriction or prevent the development of
suggestion-induced bronchoconstriction (Butler & Steptoe, 1986;
Luparello, Leist, Lourie, & Sweet, 1970). Placebos can even
reduce facial swelling following dental surgery (Ho, Hashish,
Salmon, Freeman, & Harvey, 1988). Overall, the evidence sug-
gests that the placebo effect is a genuine phenomenon, found in
both subjective and objective parameters.
Theories of Placebo Mechanism
According to our definition, placebos have no inherent power to
produce a given effect. Somehow, though, they can bring about the
effects expected or sought. For instance, a placebo taken in the
guise of an analgesic does not directly act on the opioid system or
any other pain system, but taking the placebo can lead to the
activation of these systems. Various attempts have been made to
account for such effects, the two main approaches being expect-
ancy theory and classical conditioning. The former construes pla-
cebo effects as a product of expectations, whereas the latter con-
strues them as CRs. These approaches are the focus of the
remainder of this review.
The expectancy and conditioning approaches are typically
treated as competing perspectives (Brody & Brody, 2000; Har-
rington, 1997; Peck & Coleman, 1991; Turner, Deyo, Loeser, Von
Korff, & Fordyce, 1994). In the past decade or so, a lively debate
has emerged concerning which is the better approach. In several
experiments, Voudouris et al. (1989, 1990) attempted to show that
the conditioning approach is superior to expectancy theory in
accounting for placebo effects in humans. On the other hand,
Kirsch (1991, 1997) has argued that conditioning explanations, at
least in their traditional form, are unable to account for the full
range of placebo phenomena, whereas expectancy theory can. In
the following sections, expectancy theory and classical condition-
ing accounts of the placebo effect are outlined. Then we consider
how these approaches are related and how they contribute to the
production of placebo effects.
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory has gained ground over recent years, and the
expectancy construct has largely replaced related mentalist con-
structs in the placebo field, such as faith and hope (Peck &
Coleman, 1991). Expectancy theory embodies a common under-
standing of the placebo effect: A placebo produces an effect
because the recipient expects it to. The placebo elicits an expec-
tation for a particular effect, and the expectation produces that
effect. According to this view, placebo effects are a subcategory of
expectancy effects, and placebos an expectancy manipulation.
Whereas the classical conditioning approach has been applied both
to humans and to other animals, the expectancy approach has been
used almost exclusively to explain placebo effects in humans
(although, as we argue later, this need not be the case). Expectancy
theorists do not necessarily hold that expectations alone can ac-
count for all placebo effects, but they do view expectancies as the
single most important variable involved. The expectancy account
of the placebo effect does not rule out the influence of the thera-
peutic relationship, the provider’s expectations, or sociocultural
factors. Nonetheless, on an expectancy account, the effects of such
factors come through their influence on the placebo recipient’s
expectancies.
The expectancy interpretation of the placebo effect has a num-
ber of interesting implications. One is that drug advertising may
lead to more powerful placebo effects. Walsh, Seidman, Sysko,
and Gould (2002) reported that the response to both antidepressant
medication and placebos in trials of antidepressant medication has
increased over the years, perhaps because of an increased belief
among members of the public in the efficacy of drugs. Note,
though, that if the claims made for a placebo are too extreme,
placebo effects may be less likely, as implausible claims are
unlikely to influence expectancies (Kirsch & Weixel, 1988). An-
other implication is that a drug or treatment whose only inherent
effect is to suppress the symptoms of an illness may also indirectly
help to heal the underlying cause because the mere suppression of
symptoms is likely to boost people’s belief that the treatment is
working and thus their expectation of a cure. Some implications of
the expectancy account are more disquieting. For example, listing
for patients the possible side effects of a drug may increase the
likelihood they will experience these side effects. Similarly, diag-
noses and prognoses may sometimes create desirable and undesir-
able placebo effects (Hahn, 1997). Finally, expectancy theory
predicts that people with hypochondriacal tendencies are at in-
creased risk for the development of the physical or mental health
problems they expect and fear.
An important question facing any expectancy interpretation of
the placebo effect is how expectancies produce placebo effects.
One possibility is that the effects of expectancies are a product of
anxiety reduction (Lundh, 2000). In a therapeutic context, taking a
placebo may create the expectation that one will get better; this
may lead to a reduction in anxiety, which may in turn boost
immune system functioning (Turner et al., 1994). Another possi-
bility is that the effects of expectancies are mediated by changes in
other cognitions. For instance, a placebo-induced expectation of
analgesia may lead to decreased self-defeating thoughts and im-
ages and a greater frequency of coping cognitions, and this in turn
may lessen the experience of pain (Peck & Coleman, 1991; Spa-
nos, Perlini, & Robertson, 1989). A further possibility is that
placebo-induced changes in expectancy produce changes in behav-
ior, and the new behaviors directly influence health outcomes
(Bootzin, 1985; Turner et al., 1994). For example, pain patients,
expecting improvement in their condition, might resume a normal
daily schedule, which may lead to improved mood and help to
distract them. Both of these factors may reduce pain experience
(Peck & Coleman, 1991).
A major obstacle for these explanations of expectancy effects is
that none can account for placebo effects in healthy individuals or
for the simultaneous occurrence of both desirable effects and
undesirable side effects (Kirsch, 1997). Furthermore, the anxiety-
reduction hypothesis implies that the specific content of the ex-
pectation is unimportant; all that matters is the effect an expecta-
tion has on anxiety. There is evidence, though, that different
expectancies lead to different placebo effects, at least in the case of
subjective experiences. For example, at least two studies have
found that expectations of analgesia in particular areas of the body
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result in analgesia only in those areas (Benedetti, Arduino, &
Amanzio, 1999; Montgomery & Kirsch, 1996).
Kirsch’s (1985b, 1990) response expectancy theory avoids some
of these pitfalls. Response expectancies are anticipations for the
occurrence of nonvolitional responses, such as pain, emotional
responses, sexual arousal, and nausea. Kirsch maintains that re-
sponse expectancies are the most important single factor both in
the placebo effect and in hypnosis (Kirsch, 1994) and are among
the factors contributing to phobic, depressive, and other psycho-
logical disorders (Kirsch, 1990). According to Kirsch’s (1997)
immediacy hypothesis, at least some of the effects of expectancies
on subjective variables are unmediated. That is, an expectation for
a subjective experience leads directly to that subjective experience,
without any intermediate causal links. For example, the expecta-
tion of depression directly causes depression, and the expectation
of anxiety directly causes anxiety. Less plausibly, Kirsch’s (1997)
model also implies, for instance, that the expectation of pain relief
is pain relieving and that the expectation of sexual arousal is
sexually arousing. The immediacy hypothesis only applies to sub-
jective experiences and their immediate physiological correlates
(e.g., autonomic responses such as heart rate and blood pressure).
Kirsch (1997) proposed that for other objectively measurable
placebo effects, other variables may have to mediate the effects of
expectancies. As such, variables such as anxiety reduction, al-
though they may not provide a complete account of all placebo
effects, may contribute to some.
Classical Conditioning: The Placebo Effect as a
Conditioned Response
The second major approach to the placebo effect stems from the
classical conditioning paradigm. Early formulations described the
process like this: Through the pairing of a neutral stimulus with a
US (a stimulus that elicits an unconditioned response; UR), the
neutral stimulus becomes a CS; that is, it acquires the capacity to
elicit a response similar or related to the UR. This response is
known as a conditioned response (or CR). The classic example is
Pavlov’s dogs, which salivated in response to a bell that had
previously been paired with the administration of food (Pavlov,
1927). Applying the conditioning framework to the placebo effect,
the drug or active ingredient is the US, and the unlearned response
to the active ingredient is the UR. In the course of a medical
regimen (or any other situation in which drugs are taken), the US
is paired with neutral stimuli such as pill casings or syringes, or
more generally, with objects, places, people, and procedures.
These stimuli are initially “neutral with respect to eliciting the
unconditioned effects of the active drug” (Ader, 1997, p. 140). But
through repeated association with the US, they become CSs,
capable of eliciting an effect similar or related to that of the active
drug. This effect is the CR. Within the conditioning framework, a
placebo is a CS, and a placebo effect a CR.
It might be argued that, although the conditioning approach is
applicable to objective or physiological placebo effects, it cannot
encompass subjective effects. However, this is not the case. First,
it is generally held that subjective states can be conditioned (e.g.,
Davey, 1997; Staats & Staats, 1958). More important, though, if
one assumes that subjective states are always embodied in the
brain, then objective measurements could in principle be made of
the physiological correlates of any subjective state. From this
perspective, the subjective–objective distinction refers only to the
method of measurement used. There is no reason to think that
conditioning should apply when we use one form of measurement
rather than another (e.g., when we measure analgesia by endorphin
release rather than by verbal report). As such, there is no theoret-
ical barrier to supposing that the conditioning account may apply
to all examples of the placebo effect.
Most research cited in support of the classical conditioning
account of the placebo effect has been performed on nonhuman
animals, including dogs, rats, and mice (Ader, 1985; Herrnstein,
1962; Pavlov, 1927; S. Ross & Schnitzer, 1963). It is not that the
approach has only been applied to placebo effects in nonhuman
animals; instead, the animal research has been used to support the
conditioning approach in general, under the assumption that the
same framework applies to placebo effects in humans. In an article
titled “Placebo Effect in the Rat,” Herrnstein (1962) reported that
in rats previously conditioned with injections of amphetamine, an
injection of saline produced behavior similar to that produced by
the amphetamine. Researchers have also been able to establish
placebo analgesia in nonhuman animals (Fields & Price, 1997).
Other placebo effects observed in animals include drug-mimicking
responses to anticholinergic drugs, insulin, and scopolamine hy-
drobromide (Voudouris et al., 1990).
One of the most dramatic demonstrations of a placebo effect in
nonhuman animals involved conditioned immunosuppression in
rats. Ader and Cohen (1975) paired a novel saccharine-flavored
liquid with the immunosuppressant cyclophosphamide. After a
number of pairings, the saccharine solution administered alone
brought about a decreased immune response in the rats (Ader &
Cohen, 1975). The saccharin solution had become a CS (placebo),
capable of eliciting immunosuppression (the placebo effect).
Ader’s groundbreaking experiments caused a stir, for it was gen-
erally held at the time that conditioning procedures could not
influence the immune system (see Harrington, 1997). Many of
Ader’s results mesh well with the regularities uncovered in clas-
sical conditioning research. First, as would be predicted from the
general finding that a stronger US produces a stronger CR, rats
given two doses of cyclophosphamide during the conditioning
stage later exhibited greater conditioned immunosuppression than
those given only one dose. Second, the extent of immunosuppres-
sion depended on the schedule of reinforcement. Third, in the
absence of CS–US pairings, the conditioned immunosuppression
typically extinguished (Ader, 1985). The finding that immunosup-
pression can be conditioned has been well replicated (Ader &
Cohen, 1982, 1991; Ghanta, Hiramoto, Solvason, & Spector, 1987;
Krank & MacQueen, 1988; McCoy, Roszman, Miller, Keely, &
Titus, 1986).
Difficulties in Choosing Either Expectancy or Classical
Conditioning
Expectancy theory and classical conditioning are both appealing
approaches to the placebo effect. Often they are pitted against one
another (Kirsch, 1991; Voudouris et al., 1989, 1990). We have
already stated our opposition to this view. To begin making our
case, we first note some of the difficulties that arise when this
either-or approach is adopted. First, many of the findings reported
in the placebo literature can be explained equally well by both
approaches (although, misleadingly, they are often presented as
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evidence for one or the other). Take, for instance, the finding that
placebo injections are more effective than placebo pills and cap-
sules (de Craen et al., 1999; Kaptchuk, Goldman, Stone, & Stason,
2000). This finding can be interpreted within the classical condi-
tioning framework. As noted, a stronger US leads to a stronger CR
(Wickramasekera, 1985). Injections typically contain stronger
doses than do pills or capsules, so it would be predicted that
placebo effects based on conditioning with injections would be
larger. However, the same finding can also be construed in terms
of expectancies. An expectancy theorist might argue that people
expect injections to have stronger effects than pills or capsules, and
it is this expectation that gives rise to the larger placebo effect.
Both approaches are also able to explain other findings, such as
that taking more placebos produces a stronger effect (Byerly,
1976; de Craen et al., 1999).
Another attempt to choose between the two accounts relates to
nonhuman animals. The mere fact that researchers have found
placebo effects in animals such as rats and dogs, as well as in
humans, may suggest that a conditioning account is necessary. The
rationale for this view might be as follows: Classical conditioning
occurs in a wide range of species and can therefore account for the
placebo effects observed in humans and other animals; expectancy
theory, on the other hand, confines placebo effects to humans, as
other animals do not possess the higher cognitive functions that are
the subject matter of expectancy theory. Therefore, the existence
of placebo effects in other animals argues for a conditioning
interpretation over expectancy theory. The problem with this ar-
gument is that it stems from a view of cognition in nonhuman
animals that is probably not accurate. The dangers of anthropo-
morphism are well recognized, but there is also a danger of making
the opposite mistake: viewing characteristics common to humans
and other animals as uniquely human. (Of course, this danger is
greater when one is dealing with complex and closely related
species such as chimpanzees than when one is dealing with, say,
sea slugs.) Certainly, other animals are not able to label their
expectancies with language, but this does not rule out the possi-
bility that at least some have representations or conscious experi-
ences that could be called expectations. As such, the expectancy
theory of placebo effects may be applicable to humans and non-
humans. This possibility undermines the argument that placebo
effects in nonhuman animals rule out expectancy theory.
The Relationship of Expectancy to Classical Conditioning
These attempts to choose between conditioning and expectancy
theory have been unsuccessful. The problem is not, however, that
there is no evidence enabling theorists to choose. Instead, the
problem is with the idea that it is a matter of choosing either
conditioning or expectancy theory. Before being able to specify the
role of expectancy and conditioning in the placebo effect, we need
to take a detour and clarify the relationship between these two
approaches. In our view, the key to thinking clearly about this
issue is the idea that classical conditioning can and should be
defined purely in terms of stimulus inputs and subsequent outputs.
Conditioning occurs whenever a certain type of input (exposure to
a CS–US contingency) has the result that subsequent input of the
CS results in a relevant output (the CR; Bolles, 1979). This is not
to deny that conditioning has a mechanism but only to claim that
it can be defined without reference to mechanisms. If it were
discovered tomorrow that all we thought we knew about the
mechanisms of conditioning was false, we could still identify
certain event sequences as examples of conditioning.2 The upshot
is that to claim that some placebo effects are examples of classical
conditioning is to say only that they fit the input–output pattern
that defines conditioning. It is not necessarily the case that a
specific form of learning is involved, distinct from expectancy
formation.
Having defined conditioning in this way, it is possible to state
clearly the different ways in which expectancies and conditioning
phenomena might be related. First, it may be that all instances of
conditioning are mediated by expectancies. That is, exposure to a
CS–US contingency results in the formation of a generalized
expectancy that the CS will be followed by the US. Subsequent
exposure to the CS elicits a specific expectancy that the US will
follow, and this expectancy produces the CR. (Of course, expect-
ancies may also be shaped outside the context of classical condi-
tioning.) Alternatively, it may be that no instances of conditioning
are mediated by conscious expectancies. Conditioned learning may
be entirely distinct from expectancy formation. Finally, it may be
that some instances of conditioning are mediated by conscious
expectancy but others are not. Our goal in the following sections
is to establish which of these three possibilities best fits the
evidence. Our analysis leads us to favor the third option, and this
conclusion provides a foundation for our subsequent exploration of
the roles of conditioning and expectancy in the placebo effect.
Early Interpretations of Classical Conditioning
The traditional behaviorist view of classical conditioning casts it
as an automatic, noncognitive process (Watson, 1924). According
to the stimulus substitution model, the CS in effect stands in for the
US, activating the same response. The CS acquires the power to
elicit this response purely through the pairing of CS and US. The
efficacy of such pairing was held to be dependent on factors such
as temporal contiguity (the close relationship of the CS and US in
time), and the strength of the CS–CR relationship was thought to
be a function of the number of times the CS and the US were
paired (Pavlov, 1927). Also, early theorists assumed the equipo-
tentiality principle: the idea that any stimulus could be paired with
any other with equal effect (Seligman & Hager, 1972).
2 A qualification is needed here. It is possible to block the expression of
a behavioral CR, for instance, using an injection of curare (Solomon &
Turner, 1962). Nonetheless, we would still say that conditioning has taken
place. Bearing this in mind, a more precise definition might specify that
conditioning has occurred when exposure to a CS–US contingency results
in learning such that later exposure to the CS would elicit a particular
output in the normal course of events. This may seem to challenge our
claim that the key focus of conditioning is inputs and outputs. However, the
qualified definition is in fact compatible with our position. Granted, it
makes reference to intervening learning; however, there has never been any
doubt that something is learned that mediates the CS–CR connection. The
point is that the precise form of learning, the exact mechanism, is not part
of the definition of conditioning. As for the fact that conditioning can be
said to have occurred even in the absence of expression of the CR, in
defining conditioning in terms of the outputs that would occur in the
normal course of events, we are still defining it in terms of outputs.
Conditioning can be understood without reference to mechanisms, but not
without reference to inputs and outputs.
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Although this may still be the popular view of classical condi-
tioning, this early formulation is outdated (Rescorla, 1988). For
one thing, temporal contiguity is not an essential element in
conditioning situations. In taste-aversion learning, for instance, the
US may occur many hours after the CS (Berridge, 1999; Garcia &
Koelling, 1966). In a book coauthored with J. L. Hager, M. E. P.
Seligman recounted a personal example of a conditioned taste
aversion (CTA; Seligman & Hager, 1972). Once, hours after eating
a steak with Be´arnaise sauce, Seligman experienced stomach flu.
The next time he ordered this favorite meal, he found to his chagrin
that the prospect evoked nausea. The sauce had become a CS for
the US of nausea, despite the long interstimulus interval. A related
discovery is that classical conditioning depends on factors such as
the evolutionary relevance of a stimulus to members of a species.
For instance, some fears and phobias are more readily acquired
than others, and those most readily acquired appear to relate to
recurring threats faced by humans’ hunter–gatherer ancestors,
such as snakes and spiders (Buss, 1999; O¨ hman & Mineka, 2001;
Seligman, 1970). Both CTAs and predispositions to certain fears
are examples of a phenomenon known as biological preparedness.
Preparedness contradicts the equipotentiality principle.
Research has also undermined the idea that the CS simply
substitutes for the US in releasing the UR. Siegel discovered that
sometimes the CR goes in the opposite direction to the UR. In such
cases, it is known as a conditioned compensatory response. In a
classic experiment, Siegel (1975) conditioned rats with morphine.
Later the rats were exposed to the same environmental stimuli that
had been associated with the morphine but did not receive the
drug. The CR was in the opposite direction to the effects of
morphine, and the rats apparently experienced hyperalgesia rather
than analgesia. Siegel (1984) suggested that compensatory CRs
allow the organism to maintain a normal physiological state de-
spite the impending administration of a drug and that they help to
explain tolerance to drugs. At first glance, the compensatory CR to
morphine appears to challenge a conditioning account of the
placebo effect, as there are reports of analgesia in response to
placebo morphine (e.g., Pavlov, 1927). This is an issue to which
we return later.
Cognitive Interpretations of Conditioning Effects
Although the terminology of the classical conditioning para-
digm allows us to avoid the use of cognitive terms, this does not
necessarily mean that a cognitive interpretation of conditioning
effects is inappropriate. One early dissenter from the view that the
effects of conditioning are due to an automatic, noncognitive
learning process was Tolman (1932). Tolman denied that animals
(including humans) undergoing conditioning procedures simply
acquired a mindless link between a stimulus and a response and
argued instead that they acquired a cognition concerning the rela-
tionships among events. In other words, the conditioning proce-
dures taught animals “what leads to what.” For many decades,
such a view was a minority position within psychology. This
changed during the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, during
which conditioning effects were reinterpreted in cognitive terms
(Kihlstrom, 2002). Classical conditioning was reinterpreted in
terms of the organism predicting environmental events (Kamin,
1969), and operant conditioning was interpreted in terms of the
organism learning to control events (Maier & Seligman, 1976;
Seligman, Maier, & Solomon, 1971).
One of the important advances was the discovery that condi-
tioned learning does not depend simply on the pairing of CS and
US but on the information value of the CS. Conditioning effects
are most likely when the CS is a good signal that the US will occur
with some nonzero probability (see Rescorla, 2000, for a qualifi-
cation). A CS is a good signal when it precedes the US and when
the occurrence of the US is contingent on the CS (Wasserman &
Miller, 1997). If the CS coincides regularly with the US but also
occurs frequently in the absence of the US, the CS provides no
useful information and consequently no learning takes place (Res-
corla, 1968, 1988). In addition, if an animal has already learned
one CS for a US, it will not learn a second, because the second CS
provides no information not already provided by the first (a phe-
nomenon known as blocking) (Kamin, 1968, 1969). Thus, during
conditioning, the organism learns that the CS is a reliable and
unique signal for the occurrence of the US. This information
allows it to prepare for the US (Rescorla, 1988). By this view,
conditioned salivation prepared Pavlov’s (1927) dogs for the in-
gestion of food, and Siegel’s (1975) compensatory response was a
preparatory response with the function of maintaining homeostasis
during the period of the morphine’s activity. Applying this ap-
proach to the placebo effect, the CS (placebo) does not simply
acquire the capacity to elicit a response initially elicited by the
active ingredient; instead, the CS becomes a signal that the active
ingredient is about to be administered, and the CR (placebo effect)
is a response to this information.
There are a number of reasons why this interpretation might be
called a cognitive interpretation. One is that it stresses the infor-
mation value of the stimulus. Another is that, given that classical
conditioning results in learning that prepares the organism for
probable future events, it is natural to speak of the organism as
having an expectancy concerning these events. Starting with Tol-
man (1932) and Zener (1937), a number of theorists have used the
language of expectancies to describe conditioning. For instance,
according to the Rescorla–Wagner model of associative learning in
animals (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), classical conditioning leads
to a change in associative value, where the associative value can be
interpreted as “the strength of the subject’s beliefs that A will be
followed by a particular reinforcer” (Mackintosh, 1983, p. 190).
Once classical conditioning is construed as a process leading to the
acquisition of expectancies, the possibility of reconciling condi-
tioning with expectancy theory starts to seem enticingly close.
Expectancy theory claims that placebo effects are a product of
expectancies; cognitive theories of classical conditioning maintain
that conditioning leads to the acquisition of expectancies. At this
point, though, caution is necessary. The question is, when theorists
talk about expectancies in these two contexts, are they talking
about the same thing? Before we can answer this question, we need
to clarify one problematic aspect of the expectancy construct.
Clarifying the Expectancy Construct
The issue that must be decided is whether expectancies should
be defined as explicit (consciously accessible) mental content, or
whether the word should also embrace implicit or nonconscious
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content.3 Some expectancy theorists in the placebo field take the
former view, including Montgomery and Kirsch (1997), who de-
scribed expectancies as “conscious thoughts” (p. 108). Others
maintain that expectancies may also be implicit or unconscious
(e.g., Hahn, 1997). We favor the former, more restrictive, option,
for several reasons. The main one is simply that this is how the
research pertaining to the role of expectancies in the placebo effect
and other areas has treated the matter, as demonstrated by the fact
that expectancies are measured using self-report. If expectancy
theorists really wished to claim that placebo effects are sometimes
due to implicit expectancies, then why would they go to the trouble
of measuring expectancies in this way? Regardless of the outcome,
they could claim that expectancies were involved.
Other reasons to stipulate that expectancies are explicit come
from reflection on conditioning phenomena. Consider CTAs. If we
accept the extended definition of expectancies, Seligman’s condi-
tioned aversion to Be´arnaise sauce would have to be interpreted as
an (implicit) expectation that if he were to eat the sauce, he would
become nauseated again. But Seligman reported that this was not
what he expected at all, as he had subsequently learned that his
illness was due to a virus rather than food poisoning (Seligman &
Hager, 1972). Nonetheless, the aversion remained. This shows that
CTAs happen despite expectancies (as the word is usually used)
about the probable outcomes of eating the foods in question. Also,
if one accepts that implicit expectancies can be formed during
conditioning, one would have to attribute expectancies to the
simplest organisms that can be conditioned, such as sea slugs.
Given that expectancies are complex cognitions, this would be
misleading (Kirsch, Lynn, Vigorito, & Miller, in press). These
points lead us to conclude that expectancies should be defined as
consciously accessible.
Does Classical Conditioning Involve Acquiring Explicit
Expectancies?
It is now possible to specify the relationship between classical
conditioning and expectancy. The cognitive interpretation of clas-
sical conditioning lends itself to expression in terms of expectan-
cies; however, contingency learning does not necessarily imply
conscious cognition. After all, it is possible to imagine that a
computer (which is presumably not a conscious entity) could
detect and respond to contingencies, just as it could detect and
respond to simple contiguity. Conditioning may lead an organism
to act as if it has acquired a conscious expectancy when in fact it
has not. Although various theorists have described conditioning in
terms of expectancies, some have remained neutral about whether
these are consciously accessible cognitions (e.g., Tolman, 1932).
As such, it is unclear whether they were talking about expectancies
as we have defined them.
However, other theorists appear to hold that, at least in some
instances, conditioning involves the acquisition of conscious ex-
pectancies (Bolles, 1972; Dawson, 1973). There is some reason to
accept this position. The strength of a CR is often determined by
a variety of factors other than the information value of the relevant
CS, including verbal information about a CS–US contingency
(Davey, 1997). For instance, merely informing people of the
contingency can generate an involuntary physiological response to
a stimulus in the absence of any CS–US pairings (Dawson &
Grings, 1968). The most parsimonious explanation for the fact that
both verbal information and conditioning procedures can have the
same effect is that this effect is mediated by the same mechanism.
Verbal information about a contingency presumably shapes a
reportable expectancy concerning that contingency, and it is this
that produces the CR. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that
conditioning procedures may also exert their influence by shaping
reportable expectancies. This conclusion makes sense of various
other findings, including the finding that participants’ expectancies
prior to undergoing conditioning procedures often help to shape
the outcome of these procedures (Davey, 1997; but see Unger,
Evans, Rourke, & Levis, 2003). We have reached an important
conclusion regarding the relationship of expectancy to classical
conditioning: At least in some cases, explicit expectancies mediate
classical conditioning. Later we show how the placebo literature
further supports this conclusion.
Conditioning Without Awareness in Humans
Before turning to the literature on the placebo effect, there is one
last question: Is classical conditioning in humans always mediated
by explicit expectancies? A relevant body of research concerns
whether conditioned learning can take place in the absence of
awareness of the CS–US contingencies. Although awareness of
contingencies during conditioning does not necessarily imply a
later expectancy (Dawson, 1973), if and when conditioning takes
place without awareness, this does imply the lack of an expecta-
tion. The literature on conditioning without awareness traces back
at least to Adams (1957) and Razran (1961), and recent debate on
the issue was sparked by the suggestion that conditioning in
humans never occurs in the absence of awareness (Lovibond &
Shanks, 2002; Manns, Clark, & Squire, 2002; Shanks & Lovibond,
2002; Wiens & O¨ hman, 2002). The issue is thus long-standing and
3 The issue of defining conscious awareness is thorny. However, there is
a relatively straightforward yardstick for determining whether a brain event
is conscious in a human. According to Dennett (1991), “A hallmark of
states of human consciousness is that they can be reported” (p. 307). As
such, we view an expectation as consciously accessible in a human if it is
reportable. Note that this is a criterion for consciousness in humans and not
a definition of consciousness in general. As noted, we need to be mindful
of the possibility that some nonhuman animals have conscious experiences
and expectancies. If verbal report were taken as a definition of conscious
awareness, rather than a criterion in the human instance, this would rule out
consciousness in even closely related species purely on definitional
grounds.
Even in humans, verbal report is not an unproblematic indicator of
consciousness. Although we can conclude with some confidence that if a
person reports a mental state, that state is conscious, we must be more
cautious in concluding that the absence of verbal report indicates the
absence of consciousness. As Shanks and St. John (1994) noted, “Tests of
verbal recall tend to be less sensitive to small amounts of knowledge than
other behavioral measures” (p. 394). On this ground, they rejected verbal
report as an index of consciousness. The problem with such a policy is that,
although other measures are sensitive to smaller amounts of knowledge, it
is never clear that this is conscious knowledge (Baeyens, De Houwer, &
Eelen, 1994; Catania, 1994). So, we are left with this choice: Do we wish
to accept, with the appropriate reservations, an imperfect measure of
consciousness (verbal report), or do we wish to adopt some other behav-
ioral measure that simply does not address the question of consciousness?
If we intend to pursue this question at all, it seems that, at least for now,
the former is the only option.
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vexed. Nonetheless, several findings provide persuasive evidence
that conditioning in humans is not always cognitively mediated.
We have already mentioned CTAs, which “unlike much of clas-
sical conditioning, [cannot] be seen as a ‘cognitive’ phenomenon,
involving expectations” (Seligman & Hager, 1972, p. 8). More-
over, a number of physiological processes in humans and other
animals are amenable to conditioning procedures but are unlikely
to be associated with any change in subjective awareness and
therefore could not be the subject of an expectation. These include
blood pressure, hormone levels, and immune response (summa-
rized in Turkkan & Brady, 1985). Our overall conclusion, then, is
that classical conditioning is sometimes mediated by the creation
or adjustment of an explicit expectancy, whereas in other cases the
CS–CR link is not mediated by conscious cognition.
Explaining the Placebo Effect: The Empirical Literature
The foregoing discussion clarifies the relationship between ex-
pectancy theory and classical conditioning. So far, however, no
conclusions have been drawn about the mechanisms involved in
the placebo effect. In our view, the best way to proceed in this task
is to pose questions in two domains.
1. Factors shaping the placebo effect: Do conditioning pro-
cedures shape placebo effects? Do other sources of in-
formation shape placebo effects?
2. The mediation of the placebo effect: Are placebo effects
mediated by explicit expectancies? Are placebo effects
the product of nonconscious learning processes?
With these questions in mind, we can now investigate the mech-
anisms underlying the placebo effect. Although impressive
progress has been made on this topic, some early studies framed
the issue as expectancy versus conditioning. Consequently, in
addition to detailing the studies, where necessary we reinterpret
them in terms of the theoretical analysis in the previous section
(The Relationship of Expectancy to Classical Conditioning) and
with an eye toward answering the questions posed above.
The relevant literature dates back to an experimental paradigm
introduced by Voudouris et al. (1985). This was initially intended
to show that classical conditioning procedures could produce pla-
cebo effects in humans. The generalized form of the experiment is
as follows. Participants were informed that they would be testing
a powerful new analgesic cream. The cream was in fact an inert
placebo. The experiments consisted of three main phases: a pretest,
a conditioning session, and a posttest. In the pretest, each partic-
ipant experienced a series of trials of pain stimulation, sometimes
with and sometimes without the placebo cream. The pain was most
commonly produced iontophoretically by driving positive ions into
the skin, which causes prickling at low levels and a cramping
sensation at high levels (Voudouris et al., 1990). Participants
indicated how much pain they were experiencing, typically using
a visual analogue scale. The placebo cream was applied in half the
pretest trials. The magnitude of the placebo analgesic effect was
then calculated for each participant by subtracting the average
level of reported pain with the placebo from the average level of
reported pain without. In two of the studies using this experimental
design (Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997; Voudouris et al., 1985), a
small placebo analgesic effect was found in this first phase; that is,
even before any experimental manipulation, less pain was reported
when the placebo was administered than when it was not.
The second session involved a conditioning manipulation.
Again, each participant received the painful stimulation, some-
times with the placebo cream and sometimes without. However,
the experimenters secretly altered the level of pain stimulation for
some participants during those blocks of trials in which the pla-
cebo cream was applied. For instance, during the conditioning
phase of two of the studies using this basic design (de Jong et al.,
1996; Voudouris et al., 1990), participants rated their pain expe-
rience on a 100-point scale (0  no pain; 100  extreme pain).
During the no-placebo trials, all participants received pain stimu-
lation at the level they rated 50. But during trials with the placebo
cream, the stimulation was secretly turned down to 25 for half the
participants. For the rest of the participants the level of stimulation
remained at 50.
The third and final phase in each study was identical to the first.
Each participant received the same level of pain stimulation across
a number of trials, some with the placebo, and some without, and
again the magnitude of the placebo effect was calculated. A
comparison of the magnitudes of the pretest and posttest placebo
effects for each participant allowed the researchers to determine
the effect of the conditioning manipulation. The general result was
that the conditioning manipulation influenced the size of the pla-
cebo analgesic response. When, in the second session, participants
experienced lowered levels of pain stimulation coupled with the
placebo, the cream produced a higher level of placebo analgesia in
the third session than it had in the first. Voudouris et al. (1985)
concluded that placebo effects could be conditioned in humans. In
light of the previous discussion we can agree with this conclusion,
as long as all that is meant is that conditioning procedures can
influence the magnitude of the placebo effect. The experiment as
outlined says nothing about what was learned during the condi-
tioning procedure. It is possible that this example of classical
conditioning was mediated by nonconscious learning or by con-
scious expectancies.
Conditioning and Expectancy in the Placebo Effect: Early
Investigations
Voudouris et al. (1989, 1990) used variations on the experimen-
tal design described to investigate the roles of classical condition-
ing and expectancies in the placebo effect. Their view was that the
two approaches could be pitted against one another. However, we
argue that instead of pitting expectancy theory against classical
conditioning, they pitted verbal information against a conditioning
procedure.
In the pretest phase of the first of the two studies (Voudouris et
al., 1989), all participants experienced a verbal expectancy manip-
ulation. During the informed consent protocol, they read a set of
written instructions designed to create the expectation that the
cream would produce analgesia. In the conditioning phase, the
level of stimulation was secretly lowered for half the group during
the with-placebo trials and secretly raised for the other half during
the with-placebo trials. Thus, both groups were given the same
expectancy manipulation, being led to expect a reduction in pain
when using the cream, but the second group experienced a condi-
tioning manipulation that went in the opposite direction to this
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expectancy. The idea was that this would place the expectancy
interpretation in conflict with the classical conditioning account.
The results were that participants in the first group (for whom the
level of pain stimulation had been lowered) experienced increased
placebo analgesia in the posttest phase, whereas those in the
second group (for whom the level of stimulation had been raised)
experienced less analgesia. So, when the conditioning manipula-
tion and the expectancy manipulation went in opposite directions,
the placebo effect followed the conditioning manipulation. The
researchers concluded that conditioning but not expectancy shapes
the placebo effect, and that learning overrides the participants’
expectations. They also noted that “the data provide preliminary
evidence to refute Kirsch’s assertion that response expectancies
are more important than conditioned learning in their contribution
to the occurrence of placebo phenomena” (Voudouris et al., 1989,
p. 115).
In light of our earlier discussion, we would question this con-
clusion. There are in fact several possible interpretations. First, the
effects of the conditioning manipulation may have been mediated
by expectancies (de Jong & Arntz, 1993). In other words, the
conditioning manipulation may have boosted the placebo effect
because it boosted people’s expectations that the cream would be
effective.4 Rather than supporting classical conditioning over ex-
pectancy theory, the results may have shown only that the condi-
tioning procedure was able to undo or reverse the effects of prior
information on people’s expectancies. On the other hand, it may be
that the conditioning manipulation led to nonconscious learning
and that this was more influential than the verbal information. All
we can conclude is that conditioning procedures can shape placebo
effects, and their effects may be more powerful than those of
verbal information. The role of expectancies remains unclear.
In the next study (Voudouris et al., 1990), participants were
exposed to one of two verbal expectancy manipulations. Half the
participants were informed that the cream was a powerful analge-
sic, and half were told it was ineffective. Then, half the participants
in each of these two groups experienced the conditioning manip-
ulation. The level of pain stimulation was secretly lowered for
these participants during those trials in which the placebo was
applied. There were thus four experimental groups. The first
received the analgesia expectancy manipulation; the second, the
no-analgesia expectancy manipulation; the third, both the analge-
sia expectancy manipulation and the conditioning manipulation;
and the fourth, the no-analgesia expectancy manipulation plus the
conditioning manipulation. The two groups that underwent the
conditioning manipulation demonstrated an enhanced placebo ef-
fect. However, the magnitude of enhancement was no greater in
the conditioning group that received the verbal analgesia expect-
ancy manipulation. Furthermore, of the two groups receiving only
a verbal expectancy manipulation, there were no significant dif-
ferences between those told the cream was a strong painkiller and
those told it was ineffective.
Again, rather than pitting expectancy theory against classical
conditioning and showing that conditioning but not expectancy
shapes placebo effects, the study simply compared the effects of a
conditioning procedure with the effects of verbal information,
showing that the conditioning procedure had more effect on the
subsequent placebo effect than did the verbal manipulation
(Voudouris et al., 1990). Whether conscious expectancies were
involved remains uncertain. If a clear effect of the verbal manip-
ulation had been found, it would be reasonable to think that
expectancies were involved in this example of classical condition-
ing. Nonetheless, the fact that the verbal manipulation did not
produce an effect does not eliminate this possibility. We again
have no way to know whether the effects of the conditioning
procedure were mediated by expectancies.
Do Expectancies Mediate Conditioned Placebo
Analgesia?
Several studies followed from other research groups aiming to
address this question, and the overall pattern of evidence favors the
view that the Voudouris conditioning effect is mediated by con-
scious expectancies. The first of these studies (de Jong et al., 1996)
included the same three phases as the initial experiments (pretest,
conditioning trial, and posttest), and included both a conditioning
manipulation and a verbal expectancy manipulation. However, de
Jong et al. (1996) made several important innovations. For a start,
they assessed the participants’ expectancies both before and after
the conditioning manipulation, to determine whether the manipu-
lation had produced a change in expectancies. A second innovation
was the incorporation of a new experimental group. In addition to
the groups used in the Voudouris et al. (1985, 1990) studies
(namely, a group for whom the level of pain stimulation was
secretly turned down and a control group), the researchers included
an “informed pairing” group. Participants in this group underwent
the conditioning manipulation but were told beforehand that the
level of pain stimulation was being turned down during the trials
with the placebo.
This provided a way to test the view that the effects of the
conditioning manipulation were mediated by expectancies against
the view that the manipulation resulted in learning without aware-
ness. (Note that this is not to pit expectancy against conditioning
but to determine whether the conditioning effect was due to
conscious cognition.) In an expectancy interpretation, the condi-
tioning procedure boosts the subsequent placebo effect because the
participants in the conditioning group attribute the decrease in pain
to the placebo cream (Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997). This in-
creases their expectation that the cream will produce analgesia and
results in the stronger placebo effect. On the other hand, if the
participants knew that the level of pain stimulation was being
lowered, they would not attribute the reduction in pain to the
cream, and consequently there would be no enhancement of their
expectancies, or of the placebo effect. According to a nonexpect-
ancy interpretation of the effects of the conditioning procedure, the
simple contingency between the cream and the reduced pain would
be sufficient to bring about an enhanced placebo effect. Knowl-
edge of the true source of the pain reduction would have no effect
on the magnitude of the placebo analgesia. By including both an
informed pairing group and an uninformed group, it was therefore
possible to test whether the effects of the conditioning manipula-
tion were mediated by explicit expectancies.
4 The authors acknowledged this possibility and noted that expectancy
theory and classical conditioning may overlap rather than being distinct or
competing accounts (Voudouris et al., 1990). Some of the conclusions they
drew, though, such as that learning overrides expectancy, imply that they
view them as separate processes.
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De Jong et al. (1996) replicated the finding that the conditioning
procedure boosted the placebo analgesic response, and they repli-
cated the Voudouris et al. (1990) result that the verbal expectancy
manipulation had no effect. More important to the present discus-
sion, their results provided support for an expectancy interpretation
of the conditioning effect. For one thing, there was a correlation
between the expected and the actual level of analgesia across all
groups. Further support came from an analysis of within-group
differences in expectancy and in reported pain levels. As predicted,
after the conditioning manipulation, participants in the uninformed
group expected to experience less pain when given the cream than
they would without it. In contrast, the expectations of the partic-
ipants in the informed pairing group did not change. This pattern
of expectations across the two groups was mirrored by their
posttest pain ratings. Among the uninformed participants, there
was a difference in placebo–no-placebo pain ratings, with less pain
reported when the cream was administered. However, no such
difference existed in the informed pairing group. These results are
consistent with an expectancy interpretation of the effects of the
conditioning procedure.
The results were not so clear cut for the between-groups com-
parisons. First, the level of placebo analgesia did not differ signif-
icantly between the informed and uninformed conditioning groups.
Although this may seem to contradict the expectancy view, the
placebo–no-placebo differences in expected pain levels also did
not differ significantly between these groups, and therefore these
results are not inconsistent with an expectancy interpretation.
However, another finding was inconsistent with expectancy the-
ory. Like the uninformed conditioning group, the control group
expected to experience less pain when the cream was administered
than when it was not. Unlike the uninformed pairing group,
though, the control group did not experience less pain. That their
experience did not match their expectations is inconsistent with
expectancy theory. Overall, though, despite this outcome, the
results provide at least some support for the idea that the effects of
the conditioning procedure on the placebo effect are mediated by
consciously accessible expectancies.
Much stronger support for the expectancy interpretation of the
conditioning effect was obtained by Montgomery and Kirsch
(1997). Like de Jong et al. (1996), these researchers measured
participants’ expectancies before and after the conditioning ma-
nipulation, and they also included an informed pairing group.
Several lines of evidence converged on the expectancy interpreta-
tion. First, Montgomery and Kirsch (1997) found a correlation
between expectancies and posttest levels of placebo analgesia, as
had de Jong et al. Additional support came from differences
between and among the informed and uninformed groups. In the
preconditioning phase, there were no differences between the
groups in the magnitude of placebo analgesia. At posttest, how-
ever, the level of placebo analgesia in the uninformed pairing
group was significantly higher than it had been during the pretest,
and higher than the posttest levels found in any other group. This
difference went hand in hand with an increased expectation of
analgesia; the posttest expectancy level was higher for the unin-
formed pairing group than for any other group. In contrast, among
members of the informed pairing group, there was no increase in
the expectation for analgesia and no increase in the size of the
placebo analgesic effect. The mere contingency between the cream
and the reduced level of pain was not sufficient to produce the
enhanced placebo effect. This effect only occurred when the con-
ditioning trials heightened participants’ expectations that the
cream would produce analgesia.
There is another interpretation of this result. It may be that,
rather than expectancy mediating conditioning, the verbally in-
duced expectancy overrode whatever was learned in the condition-
ing trial. But Montgomery and Kirsch (1997) provided another
important line of evidence that challenges this alternative expla-
nation. As noted, the magnitude of placebo analgesia in the post-
test phase was significantly higher for the uninformed pairing
group than it was for any other group. Montgomery and Kirsch
(1997) ran this analysis again, but this time they statistically
controlled for differences in participants’ expectancies of analge-
sia. With expectancies held constant, the increase in placebo
analgesia in the uninformed pairing group disappeared. The
between-groups difference in the size of the placebo effect was no
longer significant. This finding strongly supports the idea that the
effects of the conditioning trials were mediated entirely by their
effects on the participants’ conscious expectations. Taken together,
the results obtained by Montgomery and Kirsch (1997) provide
good evidence for the expectancy interpretation of the classically
conditioned placebo analgesia over the view that the learning
involved is not cognitively mediated.5 Thus, it is not a matter of
expectancy versus conditioning; in this case at least, expectancy
mediates conditioning.
Placebo Effects Without Conditioning
We have reviewed evidence that conditioning procedures can
shape placebo effects in humans, and that, at least sometimes,
changes in explicit expectancies mediate these effects. We are left
with two questions. First, do sources of information other than
conditioning experiences shape placebo effects? Second, are all
placebo effects mediated by expectancies, or are some not cogni-
tively mediated? We begin with the first and more straightforward
of these questions. Of the studies considered so far that included a
verbal expectancy manipulation, little evidence was found that this
manipulation influenced the magnitude of the placebo effect (de
Jong et al., 1996; Voudouris et al., 1989, 1990). Nonetheless, it is
possible that the verbal manipulation used in these studies was
weak (Price & Fields, 1997). Other research suggests that verbal
information about a placebo can influence the subsequent placebo
effect in the absence of any conditioning manipulation.
Strong evidence that verbal information can shape placebo
effects comes from studies in which participants in different
groups have taken the same placebo and been told to expect
opposite effects. The different effects then observed must be
attributed to the verbal information. As discussed, in people with
asthma, the same placebo (an inhaler) can either induce broncho-
constriction or prevent the development of suggestion-induced
bronchoconstriction, depending on what effects the researchers
lead them to expect (Butler & Steptoe, 1986; Luparello et al.,
1970; Luparello, Lyons, Bleecker, & McFadden, 1968). Similarly,
the same substance can produce symptoms of either sedation or
5 Also, beyond the placebo literature, Montgomery and Kirsch’s (1997)
results provide further support for the view that classical conditioning can
be mediated by conscious expectancies.
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arousal, depending on the information the experimenters provide
(Flaten, 1998; Lyerly, Ross, Krugman, & Clyde, 1964). The in-
fluence of information is also demonstrated by studies that show
that, when people are told that they might be taking a placebo,
there is less placebo effect than when they are not aware of this
possibility (Kirsch & Rosadino, 1993; Kirsch & Weixel, 1988;
Pollo et al., 2001). These various findings suggest that factors
other than conditioning procedures can shape the placebo effect.
Considered alongside the placebo analgesia studies, we now have
an answer to the question of the sources of learning involved in the
placebo effect: Placebo effects can be shaped by conditioning
procedures and also by other sources of information.
Placebo Effects Without Expectancies
Clearly, there are placebo effects in which conscious expectan-
cies are involved but in which conditioning procedures appear not
to be. The final question is, are there also placebo effects in which
conditioning procedures are involved but in which expectancies
are not? In other words, are there placebo effects that are not
mediated by conscious cognition? Earlier it was argued that some
conditioned responses are not mediated by conscious cognition. A
recent series of studies (Benedetti et al., 1998; Benedetti, Aman-
zio, et al., 1999) suggests that this includes some conditioned
placebo effects. In these studies, medical patients were conditioned
with buprenorphine, an opioid drug. One of the effects of opioids
is respiratory depression. The verbal instructions used in the stud-
ies made no mention of this effect. Furthermore, the depressant
effect was mild enough that, though measurable, it “was in no way
noticed by the patients” (Benedetti, Amanzio, et al., 1999, p. 630).
When asked to describe the effects they were experiencing, not one
patient reported any respiratory discomfort. As the effect was
apparently not perceptible, one can surmise that the patients had no
conscious expectation that subsequent doses would affect their
breathing.
Nonetheless, when given a placebo in the guise of buprenor-
phine, the placebo produced respiratory depression, just as the
buprenorphine had. This effect was not found in an unconditioned
control group. It seems the researchers have demonstrated a pla-
cebo effect that people did not notice or expect (Benedetti et al.,
1998; Benedetti, Amanzio, et al., 1999). It is not possible to
explain such an effect in terms of conscious cognition. To answer
the final question, then, it appears that placebo effects sometimes
involve conscious expectancy learning and sometimes involve
nonconscious learning. Presumably some also involve both. This
should not be mistaken for the claim that some placebo effects are
due to expectancy, some to classical conditioning, and some to a
combination of both. Instead, we argue that conditioning can lead
to expectancy learning and/or to nonconscious learning, as shown
in Figure 1. This figure also shows that verbal information results
in expectancy learning and that both conscious and nonconscious
learning can lead to subjective or objectively measurable effects.
This summarizes the roles of conditioning and expectancy in the
placebo effect.
However, our conclusion raises another question: When are
placebo effects cognitively mediated and when are they not? The
extant literature suggests an answer. Consider the placebo-induced
respiratory depression demonstrated by Benedetti and colleagues
(Benedetti et al., 1998; Benedetti, Amanzio, et al., 1999). This
effect, which is not explicable in terms of expectancies, involved
pharmacological conditioning (direct experience with a substance
that acts on the nervous system). In contrast, the enhancement of
analgesia produced in the Voudouris conditioning paradigm—an
effect apparently mediated entirely by expectancies—did not in-
volve the administration of pharmacological agents. This may be
the crucial difference. Placebo effects in which there is no identi-
fiable US, or no history with a pharmacologically active US, may
be mediated entirely by expectancies. Placebo effects that are not
cognitively mediated may occur only in response to placebos that
mimic pharmacologically active substances with which a person
has prior experience. Unlike sensory stimuli, which typically only
affect important and lasting changes in the nervous system if they
are attended to (i.e., “pass through” conscious awareness), the
lower levels of the nervous system can register and respond to
pharmacological agents without any need for conscious awareness.
Indeed, in the case of the respiratory depression found by
Benedetti and colleagues (Benedetti et al., 1998; Benedetti, Aman-
zio, et al., 1999), the placebo effect appears to have been com-
pletely independent of subjective awareness. Mostly, though, at
least in the case of human recipients, the effects of a substance are
noticeable. As such, it is likely that experience with that substance
will also influence conscious expectancies. Any placebo effects
resulting from pharmacological conditioning may typically in-
volve both simple nonconscious conditioning and conscious
expectancies.
The effects of these two forms of learning may not always go in
the same direction. As noted, in some cases the CR to morphine is
increased sensitivity to pain (Siegel, 1975). On the other hand,
there is evidence in the placebo literature that placebo morphine
can produce analgesia (Kirsch, 1997). This apparent inconsistency
may be resolved through an analysis of the types of learning
involved. The conditioned compensatory response may take place
only in the case of nonconscious, low-level learning, such as that
produced through conditioning with a pharmacological agent. The
effects of conscious expectancies, on the other hand (whether
shaped by conditioning experiences or verbal information), may
tend to be in the direction of the expectation. Hence, conditioning
may lead either to a placebo analgesic response to morphine or to
a compensatory response, depending on whether the dominant
form of learning is consciously mediated.
Figure 1. The roles of classical conditioning procedures and expectancy
in the production of placebo effects.
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Implications
Research into the placebo phenomenon has some potentially
important implications. The same psychological factors that gen-
erate the placebo effect may also be operative when a person takes
an active substance or undergoes an active procedure. Conse-
quently, a greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying the
placebo effect may make it possible to enhance the contribution of
these psychological factors to nonplacebo therapies. For example,
by boosting people’s expectancies for the effects of a drug, it may
be possible to produce stronger drug effects without the use of
stronger doses. There are several ways physicians could achieve
this without using deception. They could tell patients about people
for whom the treatment has worked, or they could inform them of
the clinical research showing the treatment is efficacious. Another
way to enhance drug effects would be to tell people about mild
side effects associated with the treatment. Then, when these people
notice any such symptoms in themselves (regardless of whether
these are a product of the active drug), they are likely to infer the
drug is working. This inference may boost their expectations for an
effect, which in turn may boost the placebo component of the
treatment. Using these tactics, physicians may be able to obtain
stronger drug effects without the use of stronger drugs or larger
doses.6 This would be safer for the patient, reducing the risks of
side effects and dependence (Ader, 1985), as well as lessening the
costs of medical care.
Future Directions
Our survey of the placebo literature points to several areas in
which research would be fruitful. One focus for future research is
the hypothesis that pharmacological placebo effects typically in-
volve both nonconscious learning and conscious expectancies.
Such research should use a placebo associated with an ingredient
that acts on the nervous system and also has consciously observ-
able effects. Decaffeinated coffee would be a convenient example.
An experiment might run as follows. Some participants would be
informed that the coffee is decaffeinated (informed group), others
would not (uninformed group). A control group would receive no
coffee. To estimate the placebo effect size, blood pressure, heart
rate, and self-report measures of arousal would be taken before and
after placebo administration. If nonconscious learning alone were
involved, there would be a similar placebo effect regardless of
whether the participant knew the beverage was decaffeinated, that
is, regardless of their expectations. If expectancies alone were
involved, the uninformed group would demonstrate a placebo
effect, but there would be no difference between the control group
and the informed group. On the other hand, if nonconscious and
conscious learning processes were involved, the pattern of results
would be quite different. Although relative to the control group
there would be a placebo effect in both the uninformed and the
informed groups, the placebo effect in the informed group would
be due solely to nonconscious learning, whereas the placebo effect
in the uninformed group would be due to both nonconscious
learning and conscious expectancy. Consequently, the uninformed
group should exhibit a larger placebo effect on average than the
informed group should exhibit.
The finding that expectancies mediate conditioned placebo an-
algesia fits with conditioning research indicating that conscious
awareness of the CS–US contingency is necessary for the acqui-
sition of many CRs. However, there is evidence that once an
individual has acquired the CR, the CS can evoke this response
without any explicit expectation that it will occur—and sometimes
even without awareness of the CS (Dawson, 1973). This finding
may complicate the present picture painted of the role of expect-
ancies in the placebo effect. Participants in Montgomery and
Kirsch’s (1997) informed pairing group knew during the condi-
tioning phase that the researchers were lowering the level of pain
stimulation. As a result, they did not believe the pain reduction was
genuinely contingent on the placebo cream, and there was no
conditioned enhancement of the placebo effect. We predict that if
participants were not informed that the level of stimulation was
being lowered until after the conditioning manipulation, this in-
formation would have no effect on any subsequent placebo effect.
A future study using the Voudouris paradigm could include a
group of participants who are unaware that the level of pain
stimulation is being lowered concurrently with the placebo cream
but who are told that this is what happened before the posttest
phase. This information would presumably change their expectan-
cies regarding the effects of the cream, but it may not block the
placebo effect. If this prediction were borne out, it would neces-
sitate a more complex view of the relationship of expectations to
placebo effects than is presently provided by expectancy theory.
Given the difficulties associated with demonstrating condition-
ing without awareness (Shanks & St. John, 1994), another impor-
tant aim for placebo researchers should be to corroborate the
conclusion that physiological placebo effects can occur in the
absence of cognitive mediation. Furthermore, to date, only condi-
tioning procedures and verbal information have been shown to be
efficacious in producing placebo effects. Future research might
look into the influence of other sources of learning, such as
observational learning. Our review also raises some theoretical
issues. Just as expectancy theory sheds light on the mechanisms
underlying some conditioning effects, the conditioning literature
might add to the general understanding of expectancy formation.
For instance, expectancy theorists might explicitly consider the
roles of contingency relationships and the information value of a
stimulus in the formation of expectancies. Finally, although non-
conscious learning and conscious expectancies both need to be part
of a complete account of the placebo effect, these may not be the
only underlying mechanisms. There is, for example, research sup-
port for the role of anxiety reduction in some placebo effects (Price
et al., 1999), and cognitions other than expectancies may also be
involved (Spanos et al., 1989). Therefore, the mechanisms eluci-
dated in our article may need to form part of a wider model that
incorporates other variables in the explanation of the placebo
effect.
Conclusion
To understand the respective roles of classical conditioning and
expectancies in the placebo effect, one must consider two ques-
tions. The first is the source of the learning involved in shaping
6 Because placebo effects are strongest for subjective states, these tactics
may be particularly effective for psychotherapeutic drugs, such as those
prescribed for depression and anxiety.
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placebo effects. Classical conditioning procedures are one source
of this learning, but placebo effects in humans are also shaped by
other sources such as verbal information. The second question
concerns the mediation of placebo effects. In cases in which verbal
information shapes the placebo effect, it seems reasonable to
suppose that the effect is mediated by a conscious expectancy.
When conditioning procedures are the source of learning, how-
ever, it can vary. In some instances, such as the enhanced placebo
analgesia produced via the Voudouris conditioning paradigm, it
appears that this conditioned placebo effect is mediated entirely by
consciously accessible expectancies. On the other hand, there is
also evidence that some placebo effects in humans are not medi-
ated by conscious cognition. As such, a complete model of the
placebo effect must include both noncognitive learning mecha-
nisms and conscious expectancies. A focus for future research
should be to determine the circumstances under which a placebo
effect will be cognitively mediated and when it will not. A hy-
pothesis consistent with the existing literature is that pharmaco-
logical placebo effects can involve additive effects of both non-
conscious learning and conscious expectancy effects, whereas
nonpharmacological placebo effects in humans are mediated en-
tirely by expectancies.
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